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ABSTRACT 
HUME, SKEPTICISM, AND INDUCTION 
 
by 
 
Jason Collins 
 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2013 
Under the Supervision of Assistant Professor Miren Boehm 
 
 
 This paper concerns the following interpretative problem:  Hume’s most explicit 
arguments in both the Treatise and the Enquiry strongly suggest that he is a skeptic about 
inductive reasoning. This, indeed, has been the traditional interpretation.  And yet, Hume 
engages in and explicitly endorses inductive reasoning throughout his works. I examine 
two prominent attempts to reconcile these features of Hume's position.  One group of 
commentators, the descriptivists, argues that Hume is not concerned with whether we 
ought to accept inductive beliefs; he is only concerned with the psychological causes of 
such beliefs.  Because Hume is not concerned with the normative epistemic question, 
there is no tension in his text.  Another group, the externalists, takes Hume to be engaged 
in an epistemological project; they even acknowledge the skeptical potential of Hume’s 
arguments, but they reject the idea that Hume is a skeptic about induction because they 
find in Hume an externalist strategy of justification which offers an escape from the 
skeptical conclusion. 
 I criticize these readings on both textual and conceptual grounds. Against the 
descriptivist, I argue that Hume is indeed engaged in normative epistemology.  Against 
externalist, I argue that Hume offers no broad solution to skepticism about induction. I 
defend the following interpretation: Hume endorses skepticism about induction in 
  
iii 
 
philosophical reflection.  Against the background of modern epistemic contextualism, I 
argue that Hume appeals to multiple standards for belief justification depending on the 
context of the investigation.  Hume repeatedly announces the success of the skeptic in 
destroying even our strongest beliefs, but only in cases of philosophical reflection: when 
we examine the fundamental justification of our beliefs.  But he also insists that the 
power of the skeptic is destroyed when the inquiry shifts to practical matters: when the 
context of inquiry is that of common life.  These multiple justificatory standards explain 
the apparent conflict between Hume's skepticism and endorsement of induction.  I 
conclude that this contextualist reading of Hume's work offers both the strongest 
philosophical position for Hume, as well as an interpretation which sacrifices relatively 
little of the traditional impact of Hume's skeptical arguments. 
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0.  Introduction 
 Traditionally, David Hume has been thought to advocate a radical skepticism 
about induction, offering one of the most powerful versions of the problem of induction 
in the history of philosophy. He argues that we have 'no reason' to assent to inductive 
beliefs, and claims that inductive reasoning has "no just foundation" (T. I.3.6.10)
 1
.  
These statements and the arguments supporting them have been interpreted as showing 
that induction has no epistemic value.  However, there is a strong tension between 
Hume's supposed inductive skepticism and the fact that Hume uses, differentiates 
between good and bad uses of, and endorses induction throughout his work.  The 
question then arises: how can Hume endorse, use, and differentiate between inductive 
arguments while at the same time believing we have no reason to accept those 
arguments?
2
  This paper will seek to examine how we should understand this tension in 
Hume's philosophy. 
 I will discuss and criticize two prominent interpretive approaches which offer 
quite different solutions. The first reading I will address, the descriptivist interpretation, 
avoids the tension entirely by denying that Hume's project is epistemic at all.  It argues 
that Hume is not concerned with epistemic justification; instead he is merely concerned 
with the psychological causes of inductive beliefs.  If Hume is not concerned with 
whether we should hold inductive beliefs, then there is no tension between his statements 
and his use of induction.  The second proposed solution, the externalist interpretation, 
                                               
1
 References to the Treatise are to David Hume, A Treatise Concerning Human 
Understanding ed. L.A. Shelby-Bigge. Oxford University Press (1978), hereafter cited as 
“T” followed by Book, part, section and paragraph numbers. 
2
 Interestingly, both Don Garrett and Kenneth Winkler identify resolving this tension as 
the one of the most important issues in Hume scholarship at the time of their writing 
(Winkler 1999). 
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admits of Hume's epistemic project but claims that Hume actually finds a justification for 
induction in the course of his inquiry.  This position maintains Hume is advocating a 
form of epistemic externalism.  They resolve the tension by reading Hume's claims that 
we have no reason to believe inductive arguments as saying that we have no internalist 
reason to believe them.  However, since Hume offers an externalist justification for 
inductive beliefs,  he can consistently claim that induction is not justified by our reasons 
or arguments while still employing induction in a justified manner.  I will sketch textual 
and conceptual problems with these two readings that shed doubt on the theories' abilities 
to adequately characterize Hume's epistemology.   
 After my brief examination of the two interpretations and their challenges, I will 
offer an account which acknowledges both sides of Hume's treatment of induction while 
still resolving the tension.  I will argue that Hume is employing a form of epistemic 
contextualism, basing the standards for belief justification on the context of the inquiry.  
Using contextualism as a backdrop, I will show that we can make sense of Hume's claim 
that we have no reason to believe the future will resemble the past and also Hume's use 
of inductive reasoning by separating the claims into the contexts in which they apply.  I 
will then show that the contextualist reading has additional interpretive benefits beyond 
the resolution of the tension which makes it an attractive interpretation of Hume's project.   
I.  The Tension in Hume 
 There are many instances throughout Hume's project in which Hume, at least on 
the surface, dismisses inductive reasoning as completely unfounded.  He says, "we cannot 
give a satisfactory reason, why we believe, after a thousand experiments, that a stone will 
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fall, or a fire burn" (E.XII.25)
3
.  Even further,  "Reason can never shew us the connexion 
of one object with another, tho’ aided by experience, and the observation of their constant 
conjunction in all past instances" (T I.3.6.12).  For Hume, these statements are founded 
on the principle that "we have no reason to draw any inference concerning any object 
beyond those of which we have had experience" (T I.3.12.20) along with the fact that we 
have never had an experience of necessary connection (the foundation of inductive, or 
probabilistic reasoning).  Thus, Hume is led to conclude that we have no reason to make 
inductive inferences.  Instead, those beliefs are determined by custom or habit.  Hume 
writes, "when the mind, therefore, passes from the idea or impression of one object to the 
idea or belief of another, it is not determin’d by reason, but by certain principles, which 
associate together the ideas of these objects, and unite them in the imagination" (T 
I.3.6.13).  After completing this reasoning, Hume seems to fall into a radical inductive 
skepticism.  He says, "I am ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon no 
opinion even as more probable or likely than another"(T I.4.7.8).  These passages and 
others like them have fueled the traditional, skeptical reading of Hume.
4
 
 However, a more recent interpretive trend has pointed out that Hume relies on 
inductive beliefs for some of his most basic principles
5
. Not only that, but Hume actually 
endorses inductive arguments and differentiates between good and bad inductive 
arguments as well.  This has led to a drastic change in the way Hume is understood. After 
                                               
3
 References to the Enquiry are to David Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding ed. L. A. Shelby-Bigge. Great Books of the Western World Britannica, 
Chicago. (450-509) hereafter cited as “E” followed by section and paragraph numbers. 
4
 I will argue that the traditional reading is, at least partly correct.  For additional 
arguments in support of the skeptical reading see Stroud (1977), Winkler (1999), and 
Parush (1977). 
5
 Loeb (2002) offers a history and summary of the evidence which has amassed against 
the traditional skeptical reading (322-324). 
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all, if Hume needs induction for his position to operate, surely he does not think it is 
entirely worthless.  We can see Hume's endorsement of inductive reasoning as early as 
the subtitle of the Treatise, Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method to a 
Moral Subject.  The experimental method is, at its heart, an inductive procedure: 
generalizing phenomena observed through experiment to the unobserved.   Even the 
foundation of much of Hume's empiricist philosophy is defended with induction.  The 
copy principle, the principle that all ideas are based on simple sense impressions, is 
defended inductively.
6
  This shows that Hume relies upon induction's epistemic worth for 
the very foundation of his philosophical project.  Finally, Hume rejects belief in miracles 
based on the idea that there is stronger inductive support for belief in uniform laws of 
nature than there is support for aberrations of those laws
7
.  Differentiation between good 
and bad inductive arguments seems out of place if Hume means to dismiss all forms of 
induction as unfounded.  These and numerous other passages throughout Hume's work 
strongly suggest that Hume finds some epistemic value in inductive argument.  Given the 
strength of evidence that Hume is not a skeptic about induction, we must find a way to 
reconcile Hume's apparent dismissal of induction with its use throughout his writings.  
Finding a plausible resolution to this tension will be the primary goal of this essay. 
 
                                               
6
 Hume offers two arguments for the copy principle, both of which are inductive.  The 
first is an argument from experience in which we are asked to examine any belief we can 
think of to realize that it is reducible to simple impressions. He says, "We may prosecute 
this enquiry to what length we please; where we shall always find, that every idea which 
we examine is copied from a similar impression" (E.II.6).  This is, of course, generalizing 
from observed phenomena to unobserved, or inductive argument.  The second argument 
in support is that men born blind do not have ideas of color, indicating the necessary 
impression to form the idea.  This again, is an inductive appeal to empirical evidence. 
7
 Winkler (1999) argues this as well. He notes that Hume's treatment of miracles in the 
Enquiry offers a clear case of inductive discrimination (201-202).  
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II.  The Descriptivist Reading 
 The first solution I wish to address is the descriptivist interpretation, which has 
been argued most prominently by Don Garrett.  Garrett argues that Hume is not engaged 
in normative epistemic investigation at all in the sections concerning induction of the 
Treatise and Enquiry.  Rather, Hume’s project is merely psychological; he is describing 
the psychological process of belief formation and the psychological reaction to different 
skeptical arguments.  As such, when Hume says our beliefs are not founded on reason, he 
is only concerned with the fact that reason is not the psychological cause of the beliefs.  
He is silent, the descriptivist will say, about whether we ought to hold those beliefs. 
Garrett says, "Hume's conclusion [...] directly concerns the causation of inductive 
inferences--a question in cognitive psychology--rather than the justification of such 
inferences, which is a question in epistemology" (Garrett 1997, 94).
8
  In this reading, 
none of Hume’s explicit discussions of induction and causal reasoning in the Enquiry and 
Treatise are normative.   The descriptivist reading offers an elegant solution to the 
tension because it rejects the idea that Hume ever claims that induction is unjustified, in 
fact, he doesn't even consider the question.  
 Descriptivism boasts a good deal of textual support, largely because of what is 
missing from Hume's discussion of induction: explicit normative language.  When 
discussing induction in Treatise I.3.6, Hume doesn't actually condemn induction any 
further than to note that it is not founded on reason.  Garrett points out that when Hume 
                                               
8
 Descriptivism comes in various strengths.  Sometimes it is offered as a theory solely 
about Hume's discussion of induction in Treatise I.iii.6.  Other times it is used as a 
general claim about Hume's views on induction.  I am addressing the latter, because our 
project here is to determine Hume's general views on induction, not merely in one 
section. 
6 
 
 
 
discusses induction, he only addresses the causation of inductive beliefs, not their 
normative status.  Hume states, for instance, that "even after we have had experience of 
the operations of cause and effect, our conclusions from that experience are not founded 
on reasoning, or any process of the understanding" (E.IV.15).  Likewise, in the Treatise, 
Hume says, "’tis impossible for us to satisfy ourselves by our reason, why we shou’d 
extend that experience beyond those particular instances, which have fallen under our 
observation" (T.I.3.6.13).  Here, Hume's conclusions only mention the actual source or 
mechanism of induction; we never see him stating whether we ought to accept the beliefs 
given this fact.  Reading these passages as epistemic is inferring an argument that Hume 
never voices outright.  Realizing this, coupled with arguments against maintaining a 
purely skeptical account, the descriptivists argue that viewing Hume as doing normative 
epistemology is a mistake.
 9
   
 I now wish to sketch some challenges and sacrifices which arise from accepting 
the descriptivist interpretation.  The first point weighing against the descriptivist is the 
justificatory and epistemic nature of Hume's discussion of induction
10
.  Hume's project, 
on its face and when deeply analyzed, appears strikingly normative.  Garrett rightly 
points out that Hume does not explicitly endorse skepticism, but it seems that Hume is 
doing more than seeking the psychological origin of inductive beliefs: he is seeking their 
justification.  This is shown most clearly in the arguments Hume rejects as possible 
                                               
9
 This is, of course, an extremely brief summary of the broad descriptivist claims and not 
a detailed discussion of the points in favor or against the descriptivist. The point of this 
section (and the following section) is to highlight issues and sacrifices of competing 
interpretations; a full account of descriptivism is due, but is beyond the scope of this 
paper.  For more on the textual support for Descriptivism, and detailed arguments for and 
against, see Loeb (2006) and Garrett (1997, 2006) and Millican (2002). 
10
 This objection is offered in various forms in Winkler (1999) and  Loeb (2006). 
7 
 
 
 
causes of induction.  Hume considers several attempts to ground induction and dismisses 
them as fallacious or circular.  This poses a problem for the descriptivist.  Louis Loeb 
writes, "If the only issue in play in I.iii.6 is whether a demonstrative argument causes 
inductive inference, it is difficult to see why demonstrations that are subtly flawed, but 
have an air of plausibility, could not do the trick" (328-29). Hume rejects demonstrative 
arguments for induction which depend on the uniformity principle not because they are 
implausible sources of belief, but because they are flawed demonstrations.  For instance, 
it seems perfectly reasonable that a person could be psychologically motivated by a 
circular argument, yet Hume rejects such an argument solely because it is circular
11
.  He 
says that the fact that the reasoning is circular shows that the "foregoing reasoning had no 
just foundation" (T.I.3.6.10).  This seems to indicate that Hume is looking for acceptable 
or just arguments for induction, not just those which are psychologically plausible.  That 
Hume seems to require a good proof of induction indicates he is searching for its 
justification, not explanation. 
 There is also compelling evidence in Treatise I.iv.7 and Enquiry XII to support a 
epistemic reading of Hume's project.  Hume states that we "cannot give a satisfactory 
reason, why we believe, after a thousand experiments, that a stone will fall, or fire burn" 
(E.XII.25).  This occurs after he has reached the conclusion that all inductive reasoning is 
based on custom.  If we are to believe the descriptivist, though, all Hume has been trying 
to show is that custom is the cause of our belief.  If this is so, then Hume has already 
                                               
11
 In T I.iii.6 Hume rejects that the uniformity principle on past experience because to do 
so would be circular.  He says, "If you answer this question in the same manner as the 
preceding, your answer gives still occasion to a new question of the same kind, even in 
infinitum; which clearly proves, that the foregoing reasoning had no just foundation."  
Rejecting an explanation for the sole reason that it's circular is problematic for the 
descriptivist position, as examined above. 
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achieved his goal of showing us why we believe: he has identified custom as the 
psychological source.  Additionally, Hume regards custom (the source of induction) as 
"whimsical" and "fallacious" throughout these later sections (E.XII.22-23).  The 
descriptions 'satisfactory', 'whimsical' and 'fallacious', imply a search for epistemically 
acceptable reasons for induction rather than psychologically plausible reasons.  If custom 
is the source of our beliefs, then its fallacy must be in its epistemic merit, not its causal 
efficacy.  That the foundation is still considered fallacious indicates that Hume is not 
simply concerned with the source but the rational status of the foundation.   
 Finally, I would like to bring attention to an interesting passage from Enquiry XII:   
The sceptic, therefore, had better keep within his proper sphere, and display those 
philosophical objections, which arise for more profound researches. Here he seems to 
have ample matter of triumph; while he justly insists that all our evidence for any matter 
of fact, which lies beyond the testimony of sense or memory, is derived entirely from the 
relation of cause and effect; that we have no other idea of this relation than that of two 
objects, which have been frequently conjoined together; that we have no argument to 
convince us, that objects, which have , in our experience, been frequently conjoined will 
likewise, in other instances, be conjoined in the same manner; and that nothing leads us 
to this inference but custom or a certain instinct of our nature; which is indeed difficult to 
resist, but which, like other instincts may be fallacious and deceitful. While the sceptic 
insists upon these topics, he shows his force, or rather, indeed, his own and our weakness; 
and seems, for the time at least, to destroy all assurance and conviction.  These arguments 
might be displayed at greater length, if any durable good or benefit to society could ever 
be expected to result from them. (E.XII.23) 
 
The passage reads as a direct summary of the conclusions of the argumentation found in 
Treatise I.iii.6 and Enquiry IV, thereby linking it to Hume's discussion of induction.  
Several things about this are striking from the perspective of the descriptivist.  First, it is 
Hume's Pyrrhonian skeptic that is 'justly' arguing these points (implying that these are in 
fact epistemic, not psychological, concerns), and second the result of the argument is the 
suspension of belief.  Of course, the descriptivist may argue that this is merely a 
descriptive passage, detailing the standard psychological effect of facing a skeptical 
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argument.  The descriptivist reading of this passage is plausible up until the last sentence.  
Hume rejects the skeptic's arguments because there is no practical benefit to the path of 
reasoning.  Here Hume is concerned not with describing the psychological effects of the 
argument, but whether we ought to assent to its conclusions.  Though Hume sides against 
the skeptic (and later sections will explain why he does this), he is considering the 
normative question of whether we ought to offer these skeptical arguments.  Therefore, 
Hume should be taken to be making normative epistemic arguments in the passage.  
Furthermore, because this passage acts as a summary of the argumentation in Enquiry IV, 
the arguments which this passage is summarizing should be taken to be normative as 
well.   
 Though just a sketch, these points highlight several drawbacks to accepting the 
descriptivist position.  The descriptivist must explain away the distinct epistemic nature 
of Hume's projects as well as inconsistencies with Hume's conclusions in the end of the 
Treatise and Enquiry.  Because of these disadvantages, there is good reason to prefer a 
theory which maintains the epistemic nature of Hume's views on induction, provided that 
theory also solves the tension discussed earlier.  Of course, these arguments require 
further investigation and a full treatment both for and against, but it will be enough for 
the current project to note that a theory which maintains the epistemic nature of Hume's 
project will have a significant advantage over the descriptivist solution.  In the following 
sections I consider two proposals which seek to do just that: resolve the tension while 
maintaining Hume's epistemic project.  
 
 
10 
 
 
 
III.  The Externalist Reading 
 
 The second attempt at resolving the tension appeals to epistemic externalism.  The 
externalists admit that Hume is concerned with the rational justification of induction, but 
they resolve the tension by arguing that Hume actually finds a justification for induction 
during his inquiry.  Epistemic internalism seats the justification of a belief on the agent’s 
evidence or arguments for the belief.  If Hume is an internalist, he must be considered an 
inductive skeptic because he explicitly states that we do not have access to such reasons.  
The alternative is epistemic externalism.  Externalism holds that belief justifiers can be 
something other than the reasons or arguments the agent has available.  For example, we 
may justify beliefs on the basis of reliability, stability, etc. A prominent externalist 
interpretation has been offered by Louis Loeb. He notes, "What matters here is that the 
various options – appealing to irresistibility, proper functioning, adaptiveness, reliability, 
stability—are externalist theories" (Loeb, 2006. 334).  The externalists point out that if 
Hume justifies induction with something other than one's personal reasons, then we can 
easily explain why Hume says we have 'no reason' to support induction while still 
employing it.  Internal reasons don't justify inductive beliefs: external factors do.  The 
externalists note that inductive beliefs are determined "by certain principles, which 
associate together the ideas of these objects, and unite them in the imagination" 
(T.I.3.6.12).  Hume calls these principles custom.  The externalists maintain that custom 
provides an externalist justification for the uniformity principle and induction. This alone 
is enough to resolve the tension.  Loeb notes, "Hume contributes key premises for the 
skeptical argument about induction, but he does not share the internalist framework that 
is also necessary to generate its conclusion. [...] Skepticism can be avoided, even if there 
11 
 
 
 
is no good argument of any sort supporting the uniformity principle" (Loeb, 2006. 333).  
Hume's externalist justificatory framework resolves the tension while maintaining the 
epistemic nature of the project.
12
 
 The externalist interpretation faces one major difficulty in explaining Hume's 
works: Hume maintains the power of the skeptic to destroy beliefs even after 
philosophical reflection has taken place.  The externalist position maintains that the 
proper justification of causal reasoning rests outside of a person’s epistemic position.  
However, this means that inductive beliefs should not be held to internalist standards of 
demonstrative argument.  In other words, criticisms appealing to a lack of internalist 
justification should hold no power over an externalist because the externalist has justified 
his or her belief in a way that avoids the criticism entirely.  Should the skeptical 
arguments be posed to an externalist, the externalist would respond “I don’t need a 
demonstrative argument to justify my belief; it is justified through its irresistibility
13”.  
This is characteristic of a response of an externalist position to skepticism, after all, their 
belief is justified.  However, this is precisely not the response we find Hume using when 
skepticism is presented. As we saw in the passage quoted above, "while the sceptic insists 
upon these topics, he shows his force, or rather, indeed, his own and our weakness; and 
seems, for the time at least, to destroy all assurance and conviction".  Hume also states 
that "this universal and primary opinion of all men is soon destroyed by the slightest 
philosophy" (E.XII.9).  The skeptic does not hold power only before reflection, but any 
time he engages in philosophical inquiry.  As Kenneth Winkler points out, "Hume seems 
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 Like the previous section, this discussion is merely intended to offer a brief summary 
of the attempted solution to the tension and offer some difficulties it will face.  For a full 
treatment of the evidence for the externalist position, see Loeb (2002) and (2006). 
13
 Or one of the other externalist justifications listed above. 
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to be telling us that when we occupy this view-point [of common life] (after passing 
through the fires of Pyrrhonism), the authority of the other [the skeptical] is not entirely 
forgotten" (Winkler, 207).  On the externalist reading, we would expect internalist-
skeptical arguments to lose their power once we recognized that induction was justified 
through external factors.  Placing the justification for beliefs in an external source is the 
solution to internal worries, so Hume should simply stand his ground against the 
internalist's demands.  Instead, Hume capitulates to the internalist worries until he is 
drawn back out from those concerns.  This should be taken as strong evidence that Hume 
does not maintain a persistent externalist justification of causal reasoning.  If he did, 
internalist skeptical worries should lose their force. 
 This section should not be taken to mean that Hume is not employing an 
externalist justification of induction at all.  In fact, I will argue in the following section 
that the externalists are largely correct.  Hume does justify a system of inductive 
inference through the principle of custom.  However, a key factor that is missing from the 
externalist account, one which is crucial to understanding Hume's project, is the fact that 
the externalist solution only applies in some circumstances (like playing backgammon) 
and not in others (like philosophical reflection or academia).  In the following section, I 
offer a contextualist reading of Hume which takes the progress and insights of the 
externalist reading and makes sense of the continued power of the skeptic in Hume's 
work. 
IV. The Contextualist Reading 
 
 We have seen that Hume should be understood as doing normative epistemology 
in section II.   This epistemic reading seems to leave us with two choices: the skeptical or 
13 
 
 
 
the externalist.  However, we have already discussed the difficulties with taking Hume to 
be offering purely externalist or skeptical arguments.  Consider the following passage: 
For I have already shewn, that the understanding, when it acts alone, and according to its 
most general principles, entirely subverts itself, and leaves not the lowest degree of 
evidence in any proposition, either in philosophy or common life. We save ourselves 
from this total scepticism only by means of that singular and seemingly trivial property of 
the fancy, by which we enter with difficulty into remote views of things, and are not able 
to accompany them with so sensible an impression, as we do those, which are more easy 
and natural. (T.I.4.7.7) 
 
Here, Hume is making two statements: when reason runs free, we cannot treat one 
opinion as more likely than the next, yet we are often forced by nature to accept a 
principle which produces inductive beliefs.  The skeptical interpretation focuses on the 
first, explaining how we have 'no evidence in any proposition'.  The externalist explains 
the second: that a certain principle, custom, 'saves us from total skepticism'.  In order to 
avoid the problems involved with taking either the purely externalist or purely skeptical 
interpretation, I will offer a reading which accounts for both of Hume's points. To explain 
both the skeptical result and the justification of induction, I will argue that Hume is 
utilizing multiple standards of justification in a method very similar to modern epistemic 
contextualism.
14
   
 Contextualism is a theory about knowledge which maintains that the standards for 
whether an agent knows a proposition are based on the context of the knowledge 
ascription.  In ordinary contexts, the standards for whether S knows P are relatively low.  
In contexts such as scientific or philosophical inquiry, the standards are considerably 
higher.  What counts as knowledge in an everyday conversation will not count as 
knowledge to a scientist or philosopher.  The contextualist maintains that these are two 
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 Hereafter simply contextualism. 
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separate standards for knowledge, both of which represent knowledge relative to those 
standards. 
 One method of thinking about context sensitive knowledge claims is with 
reference to the uncontroversial context dependence of terms like ‘tall’ or ‘flat’.  The 
soccer field may be flat to the referee, but it is not flat to the geometer.  However, both 
the referee and geometer are speaking truly in their assessment of the field, even though 
they are apparently disagreeing.  The context of inquiry determines whether a field counts 
as flat or a man counts as tall.  Likewise, for the contextualist, what an agent knows is 
determined by the context of the utterance.  So whether S knows P depends on the 
strength of the standards for evaluating knowledge.  Consider Pyrrho and a commoner 
debating whether or not each knows that he has hands.  The commoner, who has very low 
standards for knowledge, truly claims that he knows he has hands.  He is concerned with 
everyday tasks and simply living his life.  Pyrrho, with very high standards, truly claims 
that he does not know that he has hands.  Pyrrho is concerned with obtaining certainty, so 
he must consider the possibility that he may be wrong.  Whether S knows P is relative to 
the context of the inquiry and the standards of that context.  An important part of the 
contextualist framework will be how different standards interact with each other.  In 
cases of disagreement, many contextualists hold that the higher standards win out.  
Standards are often based on which considerations are allowed and which are excluded, 
so when higher standards bring new considerations into play, they raise the standards for 
knowledge.  As David Lewis says in Scorekeeping in a Language Game, 
The commonsensical epistemologist says: 'I know the cat is in the carton---there he is 
before my eyes---I just can't be wrong about that!' The sceptic replies 'You might be the 
victim of a deceiving demon.' Thereby he brings into consideration possibilities hitherto 
ignored, else what he says would be false.  the boundary shifts outward so that what he 
15 
 
 
 
says is true.  Once the boundary is shifted, the commonsensical epistemologist must 
concede defeat. And yet he was not in any way wrong when he laid claim to infallible 
knowledge.  What he said was true with respect to the score as it then was.  (Lewis, 355) 
 
So we see how the boundaries in a bare-bones contextualism are supposed to operate.  A 
person's standards for justification set which considerations are ignored and which are 
entertained.  When the skeptic moves to entertain skeptical considerations, those 
considerations change what is and isn't justified.  In this way, the possibilities that are 
ignored are just as important as those possibilities that are allowed.  Those contexts 
which allow many possibilities (like Pyrrhonism) are high standards and those which 
ignore many possibilities (like common sense) are low standards.  There are, of course, 
many versions of contextualism with many different frameworks for how boundaries 
interact.  These can range anywhere from theories which disallow real disagreement 
between contexts to those which state that the high standards always win
15
.  A full 
account of contextualism and its methodology is beyond the scope of the paper, but the 
brief description of the basic tenets of contextualist theory are enough to show the 
striking parallels with how Hume's skepticism functions in his works.   
 Contextualism offers us a background for understanding Hume's position.  
Recognizing that Hume is employing multiple standards for justification grounded on the 
context of the action, we can explain why Hume would at once dismiss inductive 
reasoning and employ it extensively.  First, I will demonstrate the multiple standards of 
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 For a rather complete summary of different contextualist strategies on the subject, and 
a complete summary of the varying contextualist positions see DeRose (2009) 128-152. 
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justification at work in Hume's project, and then I will explain how those standards 
resolve the tension stemming from Hume's treatment of induction.
16
    
 Hume differentiates the multiple standards of justification by which arguments 
have force in them.  He says, 
Though a Pyrrhonian may throw himself or others into a momentary amazement and 
confusion by his profound reasonings; the first and most trivial event in life will put to 
flight all his doubts and scruples, and leave him the same, in every point of action and 
speculation, with the philosophers of every other sect, or with those who never concerned 
themselves in any philosophical researches. When he awakes from his dream, he will be 
the first to join in the laugh against himself, and to confess, that all his objections are 
mere amusement, and can have no other tendency than to show the whimsical condition 
of mankind, who must act and reason and believe; though they are not able, by their most 
diligent enquiry, to satisfy themselves concerning the foundation of these operations, or 
to remove the objections, which may be raised against them. (E.XII.23) 
   
Here we see the separation of contexts, one in which the skeptic 'enjoys ample triumph' 
and the other in which her position is 'but a dream'.  These are the bases for the contexts 
of justification in Hume's work.  One, the philosophical context, is that of deep inquiry; 
this is the context in which one searches for the foundations of our beliefs.  Hume wants 
to find out which of our beliefs are supported by reason alone: which beliefs we are 
rationally justified in holding.  We have seen this argument play out in earlier sections of 
                                               
16
  The skepticism referred to in many of the following passages is academic or 
Pyrrhonist skepticism and not necessarily solely inductive skepticism.  However, the 
context of Hume's discussions of broader skepticism make clear that he is intending to 
include the inductive skepticism in these discussion.  First, that these sections operate as 
conclusions of the books concerning induction.  Indeed induction is the main focus of the 
Enquiry, the source of many of the contextualist texts.  Second, note the many references 
to causal reasoning, or any reasoning founded upon the uniformity principle. The 
uniformity principle is the "principle which makes us reason from causes and effects; 
and, [...] which convinces us of the continu'd existence of external objects, when absent 
from the senses" (T I.4.7.4).  As such, we should not maintain that inductive skepticism is 
somehow not included in these passages' references to Pyrrhonism or skepticism.  In fact, 
that Hume speaks this way of skepticisms more generally bodes well for the use of the 
contextualist reading as an interpretation of Hume's broader skepticism, though this is a 
much larger topic than the paper will address. 
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this paper, and we have seen the skeptical results.  Hume descends through our everyday 
knowledge, testing the justification for our beliefs until he reaches the core justification 
for nearly all of our beliefs: the uniformity principle.  Upon finding the uniformity 
principle without foundation, Hume is ready to reject all belief.  However, Hume 
maintains that the force of the skeptic is destroyed when we exit that context of deep 
inquiry and pursue other ends.  He says, "the great subverter of Pyrrhonism or the 
excessive principles of scepticism is action, and employment, and the occupations of the 
common life" (E.XII.21).  When we engage in action, we are placed into a context in 
which the principles of skepticism lose their force, and the principle producing inductive 
beliefs, the uniformity principle, is forced upon us. I will argue later in this section that 
custom provides a justification for both the uniformity principle and induction. I will call 
this context in which the uniformity principle is active the context of common life.   
 Of course, a brief sketch of two contexts of justification is not enough to show 
this as Hume's solution to the tension.  I will now discuss the two contexts in more depth, 
and explain how each operates as a source of belief justification in Hume's system.  There 
are two key factors to keep in mind to understand the contexts at work in Hume and how 
they relate to a contextualist reading.  The first is the goal of the inquiry.  This is the 
benefit which is meant to be achieved through the inquiry or knowledge ascription.  The 
goal of inquiry shapes the second factor: the possibilities that may be taken into account 
while performing the inquiry
17
.  These two factors, the goal of the inquiry and the 
hypotheses allowed by that goal, will illuminate how Hume resolves the tension. 
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 Note the similarities to the Lewis quote above in which what separates high from low 
standards is the live possibilities. 
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 First, I will discuss the context of the philosopher. This context is defined by the 
search for the basic foundations of our beliefs.  Hume enters the context because he is 
"uneasy to think I approve of one object, and disapprove of another; call one thing 
beautiful, and another deform’d; decide concerning truth and falshood, reason and folly, 
without knowing upon what principles I proceed" (T I.4.7.12).    It is in an attempt to 
determine these principles that Hume famously finds that we have no reason to accept 
that the future will resemble the past, and it is this reasoning which results in his radical 
skepticism.  After completing his inquiry with the above goal, he finds himself "ready to 
reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as more probable or 
likely than other" (T I.4.7.8).  This is the result of the philosophical context: the discovery 
that induction is unjustified under its considerations.  
 Because the philosophical context is characterized by seeking the basic 
foundations of our beliefs, the context involves taking into consideration skeptical 
hypotheses which serve to undermine our assurance in those beliefs.  In Lewis' quote 
above, it is a deceiving demon; for Hume it is the consideration that the future may not 
resemble the past.  Every contrary hypothesis must be ruled out in the philosophical 
context, demanding the utmost internal justification for one's beliefs.  Hume notes that 
the consideration of skeptical hypotheses is the bedrock of the philosophical context.  He 
writes, 
While a warm imagination is allow’d to enter into philosophy, and hypotheses embrac’d 
merely for being specious and agreeable, we can never have any steady principles, nor 
any sentiments, which will suit with common practice and experience. But were these 
hypotheses once remov’d, we might hope to establish a system or set of opinions, which 
if not true (for that, perhaps, is too much to be hop’d for) might at least be satisfactory to 
the human mind, and might stand the test of the most critical examination.  (T I.4.7.14) 
 
19 
 
 
 
Here we see the philosophical context being grounded by taking into account skeptical 
considerations, and those considerations rendering our sentiments unjustified. We also 
see a striking similarity with the workings of Lewis's contextualist system, which based 
standards for justification on the active considerations (the conversational score).  Hume 
has shifted the scoreboard, in Lewisean terms, to make those inductive beliefs which 
were justified before the shift no longer justified in the new context.  In this context, 
radical skepticism reigns supreme because the skeptical considerations destroy 
confidence in our inductive beliefs. 
 Hume notes, however, that by allowing the full extent of skeptical possibilities, 
the philosophical context is very limited. "The sceptic [...] had better keep within his 
proper sphere, and display those philosophical objections, which arise from more 
profound researches" (E.XII.22).  The skeptic's "proper sphere" is abstract reasoning, 
removed from real world concerns.  For "these principles may flourish and triumph in 
schools; where it is indeed difficult if not impossible to refute them.  But as soon as they 
leave the shade and by the presence of the real objects [...] are put in opposition to the 
more powerful principles of our nature, they vanish like smoke, and leave even the most 
determined sceptic in the same condition as other mortals" (E.XII.21).   Action in 
common life is antithetical to the goal of the philosophical context, and outside of that 
context, different standards weigh on belief justification.  Hume states the skeptic "must 
acknowledge, if he will acknowledge anything, that all human life must perish, were his 
principles universally and steadily to prevail" (E.XII.23).  Common life includes an 
inherent goal of inquiry: living life, and living life imposes certain limits on the 
possibilities we may consider.  When we wish to engage in practical pursuits, the 
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hypotheses which we are able to consider are limited.  These practical concerns place us 
into a new context of justification, the context of common life, in which induction is 
justified.  
 We may now ask why induction must be justified at all in the context of common 
life.  Certainly, we could live our lives if we simply assumed that we were justified in 
forming beliefs through induction.  Assuming induction to be justified in common life 
may solve the problem of making practical actions in the face of radical skepticism, but it 
cannot solve Hume’s tension.  If we are merely making a flawed assumption (rather than 
embracing a lower standard) then the fact that Hume rests so much of his philosophical 
project on induction would seem a crucial flaw.  How could the bedrock of Hume’s 
project, the copy principle, be founded merely on an assumption without justification?  If 
we, as interpreters, want to truly resolve the tension between the skepticism of Hume's 
arguments and his use of induction, we must find a way to justify induction, even in a 
limited context.   
 We have seen that common life limits how high our standards can shift.  This is 
why Hume states, as I quoted above, that common life is the great subverter of 
"excessive" skeptical principles.  This subversion comes in the form of the uniformity 
principle, which is the foundation of all inductive beliefs.  In the philosophical context, 
Hume found the uniformity principle to be without foundation; however, Hume notes that 
when we step into the real world, the uniformity principle can no longer be questioned.  
This principle provides the separation between the two standards.  It is a boundary placed 
on our reason so that we can function in common life.  Of course, even in the context of 
common life, the uniformity principle is not founded upon reason, but by "some other 
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principle which determines him to form such a conclusion. This principle is Custom or 
Habit” (E.V.35-36).  Following the insights of the externalists, it is custom which 
provides justification of our inductive beliefs.  Custom forces upon us a limitation to the 
standards of justification we are allowed to use, lowering our standards and allowing 
more beliefs to be justified.  Which specific feature provides the justification I will 
deliberately leave unspecified.  The externalists attribute the justifying force to different 
features of custom depending on their interpretation.  Loeb argues that it is the fact that 
custom produces steady, reliable beliefs (Loeb, 334).  Others identify custom's 
irresistibility, proper functioning etc.  The contextualist is not bound to any specific 
justifying factor; all the contextualist needs to note is that there is good reason to believe, 
along with the externalist, that Hume considers custom to be a source of epistemic 
justification for the uniformity principle.
18
  What separates the contextualist from the 
externalist, however, is that custom is limited to the context of common life.  In the 
philosophical context, custom does not hold power, and thereby is not an active justifier.   
 Of course, merely justifying the uniformity principle does not itself build a robust 
system of belief justification.  For instance, any common man on the street believes 
according to the uniformity principle, and Hume does not simply wish to justify all 
beliefs, like beliefs in miracles or superstitions, in the context of common life.  I will 
explain how, from the establishment of the uniformity principle, Hume sets up a method 
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 Clearly, identifying the feature of custom which provides justification is an important 
project for this interpretation.  I am partial to Loeb's suggestion that it is custom's 
stability, and some features may fit better with the contextualist reading that others. 
However, this argument must be saved for a future time.  For now, it suffices that 
contextualist can appeal to one of many externalist justifications; as long as custom 
provides an externalist justification for the uniformity principle, the contextualist account 
can get off the ground. 
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of justifying beliefs which allows us to operate as 'philosophers' in the common context.  
In doing so, Hume illustrates that the common life context is one of justification, 
separating those who reason well from those who reason poorly inside of it.  Hume 
separates the two, saying of those who merely exist in the common context via ignorance, 
"many honest gentlemen, who being always employ’d in their domestic affairs, or 
amusing themselves in common recreations, have carried their thoughts very little beyond 
those objects, which are every day expos’d to their senses. And indeed, of such as these I 
pretend not to make philosophers, nor do I expect them either to be associates in these 
researches or auditors of these discoveries" (T I.4.7.14). The 'discoveries' to which Hume 
refers are that, strictly speaking, human belief is not founded on reason and the proper 
way to form beliefs in light of that discovery.  To separate his system of reasoning from 
those of the non-philosophical, Hume offers what Garrett identifies as the Title Principle: 
"Where reason is lively, and mixes itself with some propensity, it ought to be assented to.  
Where it does not, it never can have any title to operate on us." (T I.4.7.11).  We can see 
how the Title Principle operates as a justifier by analyzing its parts.  First, Hume is 
relying on reason for the justification, but  we have seen the result of relying too much on 
reason in previous sections. Reason is the force that shifts standards upwards, taking into 
consideration new hypotheses in the pursuit of certainty.  When it runs free, it leads us 
into the philosophical context, and to skepticism.  No inductive belief is based solely on 
reason.  Therefore, we need limitations on the application of reason if we are going to 
operate in common life, and these limitations are provided by the conditions of liveliness 
and the mixture with propensity.  What it means to state that reason is lively is that the 
matter seems important and stimulates our interest.  Hume notes that in some contexts, 
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skeptical considerations "appear so cold, and strain’d, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in 
my heart to enter into them any farther" (T.I.4.7.9 ).  However, he also notes that when he 
grows tired "with amusement and company, and have indulg'd a reverie in my chamber, 
or in a solitary walk by a river-side, I feel in my mind all collected within itself and I am 
naturally inclin'd to carry my view into all those subjects, about which I have met with so 
many disputes in the course of my reading and conversation" (T.I.4.7.12). The liveliness 
condition, then, is the requirement that our reason be stimulated; that we are naturally 
inclined to assess the hypotheses under consideration. Liveliness is closely linked with 
the second limitation on reason; that reason must mix itself with some propensity: some 
natural tendency for action.  This is the external limitation of the goal of inquiry.  Our use 
of reason should be in service to completing some action (the goal of the inquiry), and 
that action places limitations on how far reason can act.  Only considerations compatible 
with the goal of inquiry are allowed to have title to operate on us.  These two limitations 
allow reason to be applied in the common context, and from them we can justify beliefs 
in that context. 
  With this principle, Hume is providing a system of justification for the context of 
common life.  In contextualist terms, Hume is advocating the use of reason to shift the 
standards of justification to the upper bounds allowed by the goal of inquiry.  The 
uniformity principle sets an upper boundary on how high their standards can shift, and 
the Title Principle recommends that we allow reason to run free up to that point.  By 
raising the standard for justification to the boundary of the uniformity principle, we are 
being as skeptical as possible while still remaining in the context of common life.  The 
Title Principle pushes our inquiry on both ends, driving our standards for inquiry up to 
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exclude beliefs that do not meet the rigorous examination of reason, while preventing 
reason's excessive application to avoid the uselessness of skepticism.  Hume wants to 
find a way to assess the questions of philosophy and science without falling into the 
uselessness of skepticism.  The realization that the uniformity principle provides a 
boundary for standards of justification compatible with critical examination and living 
life provides his solution.  The Title Principle allows reason to be applied to the context 
of common life in a restrained, controlled manner, and its use produces a system of belief 
justification above and beyond the uniformity principle.   
 This system of reasoning is exemplified by Hume's recommendation that we 
exhibit a mitigated skepticism in Enquiry XII.  Hume says of the mitigated skeptic, 
Those who have a propensity to philosophy, will still continue their researches; because 
they reflect, that, besides the immediate pleasure, attending such an occupation, 
philosophical decisions are nothing but the reflections of common life, methodized and 
corrected. But they will never be tempted to go beyond common life, so long as they 
consider the imperfection of those faculties which they employ, their narrow reach, and 
their inaccurate operations. (E.XII.25) 
 
 Mitigated skepticism is, as he says, the new context for the philosopher to occupy.  The 
philosophical context leads to radical skepticism, and Hume rejects that result because of 
its incompatibility with human life.  Hume recommends maintaining a healthy critical 
standard, one in which we are skeptical of arguments without questioning the 
fundamental principles of our reasoning.  This mitigated skepticism works well in the 
framework I have laid out above as it represents Hume strengthening the context of 
common life as far as it will go.
19
  He is using reason to 'methodize and correct' the 
reasoning found in common life: inductive reasoning.  We have multiple standards of 
justification, separated by which hypotheses are being considered, and  Hume wishes to 
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push critical thinking as far as it will go while still being compatible with the goal of 
living life.  This context is separate from the contexts of either the common man, who 
simply believes without reflection, and the skeptic, who believes nothing; it finds a 
middle ground in which we are able to apply rational criticism without falling into the 
depths of skepticism.  This, of course, is Hume's upshot at the end of the Treatise book I 
and the Enquiry: a system of principled, critical reasoning while remaining in the context 
of common life. 
 The interplay between the standards is another factor that sets the contextualist 
interpretation apart from either the skeptical interpretation or the externalist.
20
  Hume 
notes that the skeptic holds the power to throw us into skeptical amazement with his 
arguments, but that amazement is fragile.  The contextualist reads this as saying that the 
skeptic holds the power to shift the context of inquiry further by introducing concerns 
that were previously omitted from consideration, but that those considerations are only 
active for a short time.  Consider two men at the bar.  One is talking about how his dart 
will stick to the dart board.  The other man, a skeptic, goes through Hume's arguments 
until the first realizes that there is no reason for him to believe that his future throws of 
the dart will resemble his past throws.  The dart thrower must then admit that he does not 
know, or does not have reason to believe that his dart will stick if thrown correctly, no 
matter how many times he has seen the dart stick before.  However, in doing so, the 
skeptic has also made the goal of playing the game impossible, at least until the context 
shifts back.  Once the two turn their mind back to the game, and trying to score the most 
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 And also, I will suggest, another two-standard view offered in Winkler (1999).  The 
two views share important similarities and differences which I discuss at the end of this 
section. 
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points, they cannot help themselves from thinking that the dart will stick if thrown 
correctly because the context has shifted back to the practical concerns, thereby justifying 
the inductive belief.  This account is faithful not only to the Humean interaction between 
a skeptic and an ordinary man, but also the contextualist account (as seen in Lewis 
above).  It also helps us specify what kind of contextualism Hume seems to be 
advocating.  For Hume, the higher standards 'win' in a context, as long as there are not 
external limitations on how high the context can go.  Thus we see the parallel between 
Hume's handling of skepticism and the contextualist position.  
 This interpretation holds great power to resolve the tension in Hume's work while 
avoiding the sacrifices and problems of the other proposed solutions.  The standards 
explain the tension by noting that Hume separates his discussion of induction into two 
sets of circumstances.  The first, which I have labeled the philosophical context, is one in 
which he is concerned with the rational foundation of our beliefs.  It is with this concern, 
and within this context, that he makes the claim that we have no reason to believe in 
induction.  In fact, he explicitly says that those hypotheses only hold weight in the 
academic sphere, removed from the concerns of common life.  Outside of that context, 
Hume finds that we are compelled by nature, by custom, to believe in the uniformity 
principle.  From custom, Hume derives a system of justification which allows the use of 
induction, but again, only within that specified context.  What is justified for the 
philosopher in an academic hall is not the same as what is justified for the backgammon 
player, and this is crucial to understanding the apparent tension in Hume's treatment of 
induction.  The tension is only present if we fail to recognize the multiple contexts of 
justification at work in the project. 
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 This may prompt the objection that Hume, in doing philosophy, cannot justify his 
use of induction, even under my interpretation.  After all, the philosophical context 
refutes induction, so doesn't the contextualist reading fail to justify Hume's use of 
induction in his philosophical corpus?  Not if we are clear about the context of his 
philosophical work.  Hume wishes to naturalize abstract philosophy and introduce a 
practical benefit to what he sees as useless metaphysics.  This is clear even in the subtitle 
of the Treatise, Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning 
into a Moral Subject.  Hume's project, though a work of philosophy, is to introduce that 
philosophy into the practical context.  Hume recognizes the pitfalls of the unrestricted 
philosophical context, and thus adopts a strong context, the context of the mitigated 
skeptic, to allow himself to conduct philosophy with practical results.  It is in this final 
context, the one which Hume explicitly suggests philosophers exhibit, that Hume's 
project lies. Thus, Hume's use of induction is justified because his work exhibits the 
context of the mitigated skeptic, not the unrestricted philosopher. 
 To conclude this section, I would like to briefly discuss a similar interpretation of 
Hume's epistemology.  In Hume's Inductive Skepticism, Kenneth Winkler argues that 
Hume is a skeptic, but that everyday judgments are insulated from that skepticism by 
natural forces.  He builds from that insulation “two sets of norms, and with them two 
standards of reasonableness” (Winkler, 206) that he uses to resolve Hume's tension in 
much the same way as I use the justificatory contexts in the contextualist interpretation.  
The contextualist and insulation interpretations are alike in that they point out key 
features in Hume's writing which seem to suggest multiple standards of justification.  
However, while the insulation view recognizes two standards of reasonableness, the 
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interplay between the standards is better explained by the contextualist position.  This is 
the key difference between the two interpretations. 
 The insulation view provides two norms of reasonability, one in which the 
foundations of beliefs are challenged (what I call the philosophical context) and one 
which uses rules derived from a commitment to the uniformity principle (the context of 
common life).  However, the two standards are separated by largely different justificatory 
systems.  One uses a process of natural, reliabilist justification, while the other is purely 
rational.  This differs from the contextualist interpretation, where the standards are 
separated by different strengths of hypotheses taken into consideration in the contexts.  
As we have seen previously in this section, Hume speaks of people shifting between 
standards within single conversations.  Because Winkler defines the standards as being 
separated by two mostly-unrelated processes of reasonableness, it is not clear why one 
would shift between the standards so easily.  What instigates the switch between contexts 
and why should we make the switch at all?  The contextualist background provides a 
much more detailed account of the separation between standards.  We can explain the 
shift based wholly on which hypotheses are and are not active in the inquiry.  The 
standards shift by taking new hypotheses into account, and which hypotheses are allowed 
is determined by the goal of the inquiry via the Title Principle.  Without the account of 
context-based standards, we are left wondering how the norms interact with one another. 
  The contextualist interpretation not only explains how standards shift but why. 
Winkler poses an unanswered challenge for the insulation view: "why our failure to 
satisfy the norms at work in section iv gives us a reason--a positive reason-- to confine 
our enquiries to common life" (Winkler, 208).  In the contextualist interpretation, one’s 
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standards are relative to the goal for that inquiry.  Standards can be incompatible either 
because they are too low or too high for the goal in question.  We saw this with the dart 
thrower.  The standards for playing the game externally forced the skeptic to limit his 
standards if he wished to play the game.  He could keep his high standards, but doing so 
would be incompatible with playing the game.  In the same way, the goal of living life 
inherently rules out skeptical standards.  Given that we are necessarily concerned with 
living life, we have a positive reason to limit our contexts to those compatible with that 
goal.  
 Ultimately, the contextualist position may be considered a close relative of the 
insulation interpretation
21
, one that reduces the separation between standards and allows 
more of Hume's writing to be explained.  The principal benefit of using a contextualist 
framework to understand Hume's treatment of skepticism is that it allows for a detailed 
description of the workings of the different justificatory standards.  We not only make 
sense of the conflict between Hume's recommendation and condemnation of induction, 
but we do so in a more philosophically complete way. 
V.  Benefits and Conclusions 
 As we have seen, the contextualist interpretation offers a solution to the tension 
discussed at the beginning of this paper, and does so while avoiding the pitfalls of the 
other competing interpretations. The traditional skeptical reading has its textual support, 
but cannot resolve the tension.  The descriptivist has to sacrifice the epistemic nature of 
Hume's project to resolve the tension, and with it, has to explain away a large amount of 
textual support for the epistemic reading.  Also, it sacrifices some of the historical import 
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view, the two have enough similarities to see them as related in this way.   
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of Hume's argument, having to claim that Hume offers all the pieces to express the 
famous problem of induction, but does so incidentally, since he is not concerned with 
inductive justification at all.  The externalist interpretation maintains that Hume provides 
a consistent solution to skepticism, which conflicts with the text.  The contextualist 
reading avoids all of these issues. It can explain the tension satisfactorily, placing it ahead 
of the straight skeptical reading.  It does not need to dismiss or explain away large 
portions of seemingly epistemic textual evidence.  Further, it explains the apparent 
externalist justification of induction without making that justification too strong.  So the 
contextualist reading provides many of the benefits of the skeptical and externalist 
readings without the textual sacrifices of the descriptivist.  As a result, the contextualist 
reading is a very promising interpretation of Hume's epistemology. 
 The contextualist interpretation also makes sense of other puzzling passages that 
stem from Hume's treatment of causal arguments.  For instance, in the Dialogues on 
Natural Religion, Hume famously discusses the causal reasoning employed by the design 
argument for God.  He says that the argument boils down to one proposition, "That the 
cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human 
intelligence" (122). He continues that this proposition is flawed and that it "affords no 
inference that affects common life, or can be the source of any action or forbearance" 
(122).    In the face of this realization, Hume wonders "what the most inquisitive, 
contemplative, and religious man [can] do more than give a plain, philosophical assent to 
the proposition", claiming we should believe the "arguments on which it is established 
exceed the objections which lie against it" (122).  Here we see a similar problem to the 
original tension; Hume is claiming that we ought to assent to an inductively supported 
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principle even though it cannot be rationally justified.  Though our reason fails to 
establish the existence of a Deity, Hume still thinks we are justified in accepting the 
proposition in everyday life.  He says, "A person, seasoned with a just sense of the 
imperfections of natural reason, will fly to revealed truth with the greatest avidity" (123).  
Hume is noting that although the argument from design holds no weight in the 
philosophical context, the probable reasoning which leads us to the belief is justified in 
the common context.  In fact, using the Title Principle as the method of inductive 
reasoning, we have shown what Hume means by saying that one "flies to revealed truth".  
When we limit ourselves to the context of common life, arguments from analogy hold 
weight, and we are justified in assenting to their conclusions in that context.  The 
problem dissolves when we separate Hume's claims into different justificatory contexts, 
allowing induction in one but not the other.  Thus, we see the contextualist reading 
solving another apparent tension in Hume's treatment of inductive reasoning. 
 Additionally, there is a purely interpretive benefit to the contextualist reading. 
The contextualist interpretation does the great philosopher the service of attributing to 
him not only a grand and important project, but also the foresight of modern epistemic 
developments. It maintains the historical import of his work, granting him the exposition 
of the problem of induction for which he is so famous.  The revisionist accounts, 
especially the descriptivist, would have us extensively revise Hume's project in order to 
make sense of the apparent inconsistencies.  The contextualist reading, on the other hand, 
is highly compatible with the traditional skeptical account; Hume is a skeptic about 
induction, but only in a specific context.  Though this is not necessarily a decisive 
advantage, it does offer an air of plausibility when theories can be made to work without 
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being overly revisionary. As Adi Parush wrote, "It could possibly happen that generations 
of scholars have again and again been mistaken as to a philosopher's basic intentions. But 
one should certainly check and double-check any such revolutionary interpretation lest 
one fall a victim to it" (Parush, 3).  That contextualism offers a defense and 
modernization of the traditional interpretation is, at least to some degree, a benefit of the 
theory. 
 I have argued that Hume is best understood as employing multiple standards of 
justification for induction in a manner very similar to modern epistemic contextualism.  
Inductive reasoning, it turns out, is justified in Hume's account, but only in a limited 
context.  Likewise, Hume endorses inductive skepticism, but only in a different context.  
In the philosophical context, induction is unfounded, yet we are driven by nature to 
operate in a context in which the uniformity principle and causal reasoning are justified.  
For Hume, the justification of beliefs varies based on the context of the inquiry, and 
realizing this resolves any apparent tension between his use and criticism of inductive 
reasoning.  
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